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Introduction
Over three decades, fuel poverty has been recognised as a distinct form of poverty, arising primarily from the interactions between energy prices, energy efficiency and low income (Moore, 2012) . Previous research suggests that fuel poverty can have debilitating effects (Liddell and Morris, 2010) , limit the life chances of children (Harker, 2006) and lead to excess winter mortality (Healy, 2003; Marmot Team Review, 2011) . Age UK (2012) estimated that the National Health Service (NHS) incurs a cost in order of £1.3 billion per annum to provide services to elderly people suffering from conditions related to cold homes. It is estimated that around one tenth of English households are in fuel poverty (2.5 million in 2015/6), many of whom include vulnerable single parents, children and elderly people (BEIS, 2017) . Although measures of fuel poverty vary across different European countries, estimates of the prevalence of fuel poverty for the EU27 range between less than 5% (e.g. Sweden and Finland) to over 40% (Bulgaria) 1 (Thomson et al., 2016) . As several European countries are engaged in the fight against fuel poverty (e.g. France and Republic of Ireland), reliable and transparent indicators of fuel poverty are necessary to help policymakers address fuel poverty and the associated social issues.
While the measurement of fuel poverty has often relied on subjective approaches (Healy and Clinch, 2002; Waddams Price et al., 2012) , objective measures, such as the Low-Income-High-Cost (LIHC) indicator (Hills 2011 (Hills , 2012 , are favoured by the United Kingdom's government and are gaining traction in EU-based research (Legendre and Ricci, 2015; Bouzarovski and Tirado Herrero, 2017) . However, the LIHC indicator is an opaque instrument, which draws upon vast amounts of household and property information to construct 1) the poverty threshold (i.e. 60% of the national median equivalised after housing costs income 2 , adjusted for required 3 1 Households are defined as fuel poor if they answer affirmatively to the question: are you able to keep your home adequately warm? Subjective measures have helped gauge the prevalence of fuel poverty in the EU in the absence of national (and uniform) objective indicators (Healy and Clinch, 2002; Thomson and Snell, 2013) . 2 Definitions of income, housing and energy costs and the household are provided in the Appendix, together with the equivalisation factors located in Table A1 and Table A2 respectively 3 Importantly, required energy costs are calculated on the basis of household needs (e.g. minimum internal temperatures, adequate lighting, ample hot water) rather than actual energy expenditure, in order to circumvent the problem of energy rationing (BEIS, 2017) . Note also that the reduction in energy costs) and 2) the energy cost threshold (i.e. the national median of required equivalised energy costs).
A central pillar of the LIHC definition is the process of deducting housing costs from income to better reflect household disposable income (Hills, 2012) . The public debate has been inflamed by the fact that households with below average incomes have seen a rise in housing expenditure of around £714 on average, compared to a fall of £217 for those with incomes above average, over the period since the financial crisis (2007/8 to 2015/6) (FT, 2017) . Whereas, during the same period, the average fuel poverty gap in real terms has crept up from £324 to £353 (BEIS, 2017) . This paper develops a framework that generates a clearer understanding of how the incidence of low income and high housing and energy costs affect the composition of fuel poverty.
In doing so, this paper attempts to move beyond the fall-back position that fuel poverty is best remedied by schemes primarily designed to improve energy efficiency, rather than by other means such as supporting income (Middlemiss, 2016) . Utilising three key economic variablesincome, housing costs, and energy costswe put forward a conceptual and empirical framework that brings to the surface three dimensions of poverty underpinning the LIHC indicator: 1) income-poverty (IP); 2) housing-cost-induced-poverty (HIP); and, 3) fuel-cost-induced-poverty (FIP). In doing so, it becomes clear, by construction, that for households who find themselves below the poverty thresholdeither due to low-income (i.e. IP) or to housing costs (i.e. HIP) (Kutty, 2005 )deducting the required amount of income to achieve acceptable levels of energy services pushes those households even further below the poverty threshold. Whereas, for the latter (FIP) group deducting the required energy costs from income (adjusted for housing costs) is the trigger that pushes the households below the poverty threshold, an issue that Legendre and Ricci (2015) (LAR hereafter) refer to as fuel vulnerability.
Our conceptual and empirical framework is distinct from the 'after-fuel-cost-poverty' approach, which assumes that all households below the poverty threshold are in fuel poverty after deducting fuel costs (Hills, 2011; LAR, 2015) . Similarly, LAR (2015) required energy costs needed to bring a household below the threshold (the 'fuel-poverty-gap') can be used to estimate the aggregate or average depth of fuel poverty.
propose that households below the poverty threshold after deducting energy costs, but not before, are fuel vulnerable using the after-fuel-cost-poverty approach. Our proposed strategy departs from this approach by invoking the HIP definition and applying the energy cost threshold, which implies that all households within the LIHC group can be considered fuel vulnerable.
More specifically, within the LIHC group, income-poor and housing-cost-inducedpoor households are vulnerable to relatively high energy costs albeit from a precarious position because they are already in poverty prior to deducting energy costs from their income (i.e., IP-HC and HIP-HC, respectively). Within the LIHC group, the fuel-costinduced-poor group are vulnerable to relatively high energy costs albeit from a less precarious position because they are pushed into poverty exclusively after deducting energy costs (i.e. FIP-HC).
Applying a multinomial logit framework to data from the English Housing Survey, a nationally representative sample of households and housing stock, this paper reveals that the three dimensions of poverty contained within the LIHC are statistically differentiated. This finding has important policy implications, not only for the English definition of fuel poverty, but also for any (fuel) poverty measure which relies on the after-housing-cost (energy-cost) approach. By acknowledging the information underpinning the construction of the LIHC indicator, the present study not only adds to the existing literature in this area by proposing alternative definitions of fuel poverty (IP-HC, HIP-HC and FIP-HC), through the lens of 'housing-cost-inducedpoverty' and LIHC indicators; but also develops a broader set of policy measures aimed at specific dimensions of fuel poverty.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines our conceptual and empirical framework that brings to the surface three dimensions of fuel poverty.
Section 3 describes our data, methodology and results, before providing concluding remarks and policy insights in Section 4.
Conceptual framework
According to the LIHC indicator a household is defined as fuel poor, if they: 1) "have required fuel costs that are above the national median level"; and, 2) "were to spend that amount they would be left with a residual income below the official poverty line" (Hills, 2012: 9) . As illustrated in Figure 1 , these thresholds create the quadrants of the LIHC framework.
The energy cost threshold equals the national median of equivalised required energy costs on the y-axis (Figure 1, solid Figure adapted from Hills (2011 Hills ( , 2012 . This figure is an illustration of the distributions within each group but does not attempt to accurately represent the number of households within each group nor the spread of the distributions.
The first dimension, 'income-poverty' (IP), represents households whose earnings fall below the poverty threshold before and after deducting housing costs 4 (Figure 1 , 4 It is worth highlighting that some households, who find themselves below the poverty threshold before housing costs (BHC) are deducted from income, can 'escape' poverty after accounting for housing costs and upon recalculating the median AHC equivalised income. This can be the case for the households with relatively low (or zero) housing costs, such as small households (and homeowners). green area). This group's earnings are generally below what is necessary to achieve a minimum standard of living regardless of the cost of essential goods and services.
Professor John Hills (2011 Hills ( , 2012 argues that measuring fuel poverty after deducting housing costs better represents the income left at the command of the household.
Removing housing costs helps control for regional variation in affordability and relative quality of housing (DWP, 2012 Clearly some households are more likely to fall below the poverty threshold after deducting housing costs (DWP, 2015) :
"…in many cases, housing costs have the effect of pulling a subset of households just below the income threshold and into fuel poverty." (DECC, 2014) Taking this issue into account, the second dimension of poverty invokes Kutty's (2005) 'housing-cost-induced-poverty' (HIP) approach, which defines householdsto be in HIP if they fall below the poverty threshold after deducting housing costs but not before. The HIP group is represented by the yellow area in Figure 1 . To our knowledge the links between housing-cost-poverty and fuel poverty are yet to be drawn.
The concept of being 'pushed' (DECC, 2016) or 'tipping' (Imbert et al., 2016) into poverty after deducting energy costs clearly echoes the notion of housing-costinduced-poverty. For example, LAR utilise the after-fuel-cost poverty approach in order to define fuel-vulnerability 5 as:
"households who were not exposed to poverty prior to paying fuel bills...fuel vulnerable households [are] those who become fuel poor specifically and uniquely because of their domestic fuel expenses…" (p. 626)
LAR use this setup to estimate the key demographic, socio-economic and housing characteristics influencing the probability of households being fuel-vulnerable, using a Logit and complementary log-log model on a cross-section of households in France.
Our strategy deviates from LAR's approach for several key reasons. First, although the use of fuel-vulnerability in LAR's study is appropriate, we define the third dimension of poverty (i.e. falling below the poverty threshold once energy costs are deducted but not before) using the term fuel-cost-induced-poverty (FIP) in order to be consistent with the concept of housing-cost-induced-poverty (HIP) 6 . It is important to note that before implementing the energy cost threshold fuel vulnerability and fuelcost-induced-poverty are conceptually equivalent.
Secondly, ignoring the energy cost threshold overlooks the relative nature of energy expenditure and needs. With this in mind, LAR's fuel-vulnerable group contains both low-income-low-cost and low-income-high-cost households, according to the LIHC approach (respectively, the checked and solid pink areas in Figure 1 ). As a result, the concept of fuel-vulnerability takes on a broader meaning, i.e. the likelihood of experiencing fuel poverty (Bouzarovski and Petrova, 2015) , which can occur beyond the energy cost threshold and below the poverty threshold. This is because households above the energy cost threshold experience relatively high energy costs, albeit, in this case, from a precarious position as they are pushed into poverty subsequent to deducting energy costs.
The present paper therefore formally defines the third dimension of poverty above the energy cost threshold as fuel-cost-induced-poverty-high-cost (FIP-HC) ( Figure 1 , solid pink area). The FIP-HC definition indicates that fuel costs prevent households from reaching an acceptable standard of living if:
they avoid poverty prior to meeting required energy costs, but they would be pushed below the poverty threshold if they were to spend above the national median of the required amount of income on energy costs.
Lastly, upon applying the energy cost threshold, there is no objective reason to constrain the concept of energy vulnerability to households pushed below the income threshold 'uniquely' due to fuel costs. That is, income-poor (IP) and housing-costinduced-poor (HIP) households are vulnerable to relatively high energy costs albeit from a precarious position because they are in poverty prior to deducting energy costs.
Hence, we define households in income-poverty and housing-cost-induced-poverty, above the energy cost threshold, as IP-HC and HIP-HC, respectively as follows ( Figure 1 , solid green and solid yellow areas) 7 :
 they are below the poverty threshold before and after deducting housing costs from income, and if they were to spend above the national median of the required amount of income on energy costs.
 they avoid poverty prior to meeting housing costs, but they would be pushed below the poverty threshold after deducting housing costs from income, and if they were to spend above the national median of the required amount of income on fuel costs.
These dimensions of (fuel) poverty highlight the importance of distinguishing between households who are in traditional income-poverty and those who fall into poverty due to actual expenditures (under a positivist approach), or because of meeting their energy requirements (under a normative approach). This adjustment helps re-emphasise that fuel poverty is a distinct problem from general poverty, but, for some households, poverty is exacerbated by fuel costs (IP and HIP), and for other households, fuel costs may indeed push them into poverty (FIP).
Data, methodology and results
We rely on data from the English Housing Survey ( The empirical analysis in this paper relies on a multinomial logit regression, rather than the binary logit regression adopted by LAR and DECC (2013). Our approach is flexible enough to explore the likelihood of a household moving away from the high- The baseline category b is set equal to high-income (j=7). We use maximum likelihood to estimate the probability of a household belonging to a category j=1,…,6, relative to the baseline b, conditional on a vector of regressors X i(t). The vector of coefficients β is converted into relative risk ratios (RRRs) using an exponential transformation. Following a systematic review of the academic and policy literature, a comprehensive list of likely determinants of fuel poverty was identified. representative and the household's socio-economic classification. As the prevalence of fuel poverty in England is generally lower for elderly households, the age of the household representative is also included. Education, marital status and ethnicity are also controlled for. Heating requirements are captured by the number of adults and children in the household (Harker, 2006; Waddams Price et al., 2012) . Housing tenure (and length of residency) is included as a higher rate of energy efficient technologies has been observed in owner-occupied compared to privately rented properties (Leicester and Stoye, 2013) . The age of the property is included to control for the difference in housing quality (DECC, 2014; Walker et al., 2014) , as have the main source of fuel, heating system age, the lack of insulation systems, property type and size. Finally, a set of indicators are included to control for regional and time effects. Table 3 presents the relative risk ratios (RRRs) of being in the following groups as opposed to the baseline high-income group: 1) IP-HC, 2) IP-LC, 3) HIP-HC, 4) HIP-LC, 5) FIP-HC and 6) FIP-LC. The colours in the second and third row of Table 3 map onto the groups represented in Figures 1 and 2 .
Similar to LAR's findings for the fuel-vulnerable group (i.e. FIP-HC and FIP-LC combined), the results presented in Table 3 (Column 5) suggest that retired households, without degree qualifications, private tenants, living in older properties, with poor insulation, and those who use solid fuels are more likely to belong to the FIP-HC group, compared to high income households. Interestingly, these similarities exist despite the fact that we are using an English sample, and required energy costs (rather than actual expenditure) and that we have introduced the energy cost threshold.
In contrast with LAR's findings, whereby single households and those using boilers were more likely to be in their 'fuel-vulnerability' group, our results suggest that it is large households and households using electric heating who are more likely to be in the FIP-HC group.
It is possible to test whether the significant RRRs are equal for the FIP-HC and HIP-HC groups using a likelihood-ratio (LR) test. For example, a test of equality (based on the Chi-square statistics) on the variable 'electricity' suggests that households in the FIP-HC group are more likely to heat their homes with expensive electric systems relative to those in either the IP-HC group or HIP-HC group. Hence it could be argued that income support or energy-related schemes could be targeted towards households who are just below the poverty threshold and are using electric systems.
Moreover, the equality tests imply that the RRR for the variable 'disability' is significantly larger in the FIP-HC group. This implies that households whose representative is either disabled or has a long-term illness are more likely to be located in the FIP-HC group than HIP-HC or IP-HC. What is more, since the RRR for disability is below 1 for all dimensions of poverty, these results suggest that, on average, disability and illness related benefits could be sufficient to provide the goods and services required for an acceptable standard of living. However, for households just below the poverty threshold, Government payments appear insufficient for the purchase of all goods and services necessary for an acceptable standard of living, such as food, clothing etc., after paying for housing and energy costs. Hence, ensuring that vulnerable households have access to support that meets both housing and energy needs is essential. The Chi-square (1) statistics suggest that the RRR for the HIP-HC group is significantly larger if the household representative person is working part-time, unemployed or in full-time education and living in the privately rented housing with an uninsulated roof, compared to the FIP-HC group. These findings suggest that income, housing or other energy related support, could be directed towards households who are less active (or inactive) in the labour market and living in the privately rented sector. This could help households located in the HIP-HC group advance across the poverty threshold. Indeed, these methods of support could be issued nationwide since the regional indicators are insignificant for the HIP-HC group, unlike the IP-HC and FIP-HC counterparts.
The results in Table 3 (Column 1) further suggest that young and/or male respondents are uniquely more likely to be located in IP-HC group (relative to the high-income group), compared to the HIP-HC and FIP-HC groups. We also find that the RRRs for the labour market variables are significantly greater for IP-HC relative to all other poverty dimensions, particularly unemployment. Moreover, non-white households, households with a greater number of adults and children and households living in large and ageing properties are significantly more likely to be located in IP-HC.
An important consideration for policy purposes relates to housing tenure. To unravel the story behind tenure we conducted three sets of the equality tests on the tenure RRRs (Private rental sector, local authority housing and registered social landlords):
between groups on either side of the energy cost threshold (e.g. IP-HC vs. IP-LC);
within the LIHC quadrant (e.g. IP-HC vs. HIP-HC); and for each dimension of poverty. The tests suggest that households living in social housing are more likely to fall below the energy cost threshold 12 . This implies that, if policymakers aim to help households to move across the energy cost threshold and out of fuel poverty, then they should focus their energy-related schemes either on private tenants or homeowners for all dimensions of poverty. If policymakers want to focus instead on the poverty threshold the picture becomes more complex. The tests imply that for the IP-HC and HIP-HC groups, targeting the private rental sector is crucial since the private rental sector's relative risk ratio is significantly larger (than for local authority housing and registered social landlords). The local authority housing's relative-riskratio is significantly larger (than for the private rental sector and registered social landlords) for the FIP-HC group. In this case targeting local authority owned housing could help households located in the FIP-HC group who are just below the poverty threshold 13 .
The policy recommendations identified for the HIP-HC group can largely be extended to the IP-HC group. Nevertheless, there are some important socio-demographic considerations that could improve the policymaker's ability to target those most in need. Firstly, the equality tests and magnitude of the RRRs suggest that income, housing or energy-related support can focus on households whose primary earner is unemployed or in full-time education, followed by households in part-time work or retired households. Secondly, national and local government programmes could be targeted towards households whose primary earner is young, male and residing in precarious living conditions, particularly old properties in need of retrofitting. Thirdly, such schemes could be directed to regions outside of London and the South East.
Diagnostic checks
Several restrictions must be satisfied to justify collapsing the dimensions of poverty, as it is done in the standard LIHC approach, or like the fuel-vulnerability group implemented by LAR (which combines FIP-LC and FIP-HC). Using the results presented in Table 3 , a Wald test is used to test whether the RRRs are significantly different across the dimensions of poverty. There are 21 restrictions, equivalent to the number of pairwise outcomes which can be generated between j=7 categories (counting a single pair only once and excluding homogenous pairs). The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the difference in the coefficients estimated for each pair are jointly equal to zero at the 1% level (p-values=0.000). Since the equality of all pairwise combinations of the groups is statistically rejected, this paper fundamentally highlights the fact that the current LIHC grouping overshadows important dimensions of fuel-poverty and suggests that the groupings used in previous research, such as LAR's, can be usefully extended.
Concluding remarks
This Compared to previous research, the findings in this paper demonstrate that an alternative modelling strategy can be applied to better understand the various dimensions of poverty within the LIHC fuel poverty quadrant, rather than treating these dimensions as one. More specifically, in contrast with LAR (2015), who overlook these additional dimensions of poverty, this paper suggests that the poverty dimensions contained within the LIHC are each associated with a specific set of socio-demographic and housing characteristics. Our findings suggest that the incomepoor and housing-cost-induced-poor groups are less active in the labour market and tend to be of non-white ethnicity, relative to the fuel-cost-induced-poverty group. The household representative person is more likely to be young, male and a homeowner or tenant in the income-poor group, whereas, households in the housing-cost-inducedpoverty group are concentrated in the private rental sector. This paper uncovers three unique dimensions of poverty dormant beneath the structure of the UK's official fuel poverty indicator, providing information previously hidden as a result of aggregation.
As a result, this paper provides an important tool for policy makers on two distinct fronts. First, the three dimensions of poverty we identify could be considered by Governmental departments in the UK, to complement the current income afterhousing cost approach. Indeed their current adoption of a binary poverty indicator ignores the fact that some households fall below the poverty threshold before and after housing and energy costs are considered. This is an important group to consider, not least because households within this group have the lowest average income compared to households in the other two dimensions of poverty, i.e. those who fall below the poverty threshold upon deducting housing or energy costs, but not before.
In doing so, the UK Government could evaluate the efficacy of income and energyrelated schemes by assessing the impact of such measures on households who are unable to afford essential goods and services required for a socially acceptable standard of living.
Second, and just as importantly, policy could be designed by focusing on the threshold of interest. For example, our results suggest that, from the policymaker's perspective, energy-related schemes could be targeted specifically to the private rented sector and/or homeowners in order to bring these sectors in-line with the greater level of energy efficiency offered by the social sector. Our tests also suggest that this approach could be applied across all the dimensions of fuel poverty. In contrast, the policymakers could design income, housing and energy-related schemes that target specific types of house tenures for each dimension of poverty above the energy cost threshold. This could be a more efficient method to allocate funds aimed at alleviating the burden of relatively high energy costs.
As fuel-cost-induced poverty is far less widespread than housing-cost-inducedpoverty and income-poverty, the primary responsibility of Government regarding fuel poverty should be the alleviation of the impact of high energy costs for the households below the poverty threshold before accounting for their energy costs. However, targeting only the largest groups would miss out another important group of vulnerable households, who might not be effectively supported by measures aimed at households with different socio-economic characteristics.
Appendix

A1 Household and other definitions
A household is defined as a group of individuals living in the same building and share at least some of the utilities and main living space within the building.
Full income, as defined in the EHS, is the annual net income of the whole household from any source, including benefit sources such as housing benefits (net council tax payments) and winter fuel payments, as well as savings, investments, mortgage interest and mortgage payment protection insurance.
Housing costs are defined as the total annualised mortgage payments and annualised rent payments, excluding service charges (in British pounds per year). The former applies to households who are purchasing a property with a mortgage either solely or via shared ownership. The latter concerns households who live in either rented accommodation or shared owners' housing. Furthermore, households who own their homes outright or live rent-free have zero housing costs.
Energy costs per year (£) comprise of the total gas and electricity (or solid fuel) expenditure that is required to meet the basic needs of the household including the cost of space heating, water, cooking and lighting.
A2 Equivalisation Factors
Income equivalisation factors work to balance household annual income and energy costs in order to reflect differences in household size and composition. The baseline household of comparison typically used when computing equivalisation factors is a couple with no children, and receives a factor equal to one. In contrast, a single household receives a smaller factor (i.e. less than one), while the factor attributed to larger households is greater than one. Hence the income of a larger household, who earns the same as a smaller household, is reduced to reflect a lower income per capita. 
